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conditioned by the foreknowledge of God. The objections raised to it are, in the main, always
the same.
1. IT IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE MORAL FREEDOM OF MAN.
Man is a free agent with the
power of rational self-determination. He can reflect upon, and in an intelligent way choose,
certain ends, and can also determine his action with respect to them. The decree of God
however, carries with it necessity. God has decreed to effectuate all things or, if He has not
decreed that, He has at least determined that they must come to pass. He has decided the
course of man’s life for him.[Cf. Watson, Theological Institutes, Part II, Chap. XXVIII; Miley,
Systematic Theology II, pp. 271 ff.] In answer to this objection it may be said that the Bible
certainly does not proceed on the assumption that the divine decree is inconsistent with the
free agency of man. It clearly reveals that God has decreed the free acts of man, but also that
the actors are none the less free and therefore responsible for their acts, Gen. 50:19,20; Acts
2:23; 4:27,28. It was determined that the Jews should bring about the crucifixion of Jesus; yet
they were perfectly free in their wicked course of action, and were held responsible for this
crime. There is not a single indication in Scripture that the inspired writers are conscious of a
contradiction in connection with these matters. They never make an attempt to harmonize the
two. This may well restrain us from assuming a contradiction here, even if we cannot reconcile
both truths.
Moreover, it should be borne in mind that God has not decreed to effectuate by His own direct
action whatsoever must come to pass. The divine decree only brings certainty into the events,
but does not imply that God will actively effectuate them, so that the question really resolves
itself into this, whether previous certainty is consistent with free agency. Now experience
teaches us that we can be reasonably certain as to the course a man of character will pursue
under certain circumstances, without infringing in the least on his freedom. The prophet
Jeremiah predicted that the Chaldeans would take Jerusalem. He knew the coming event as a
certainty, and yet the Chaldeans freely followed their own desires in fulfilling the prediction.
Such certainty is indeed inconsistent with the Pelagian liberty of indifference, according to
which the will of man is not determined in any way, but is entirely indeterminate, so that in
every volition it can decide in opposition, not only to all outward inducements, but also to all
inward considerations and judgments, inclinations and desires, and even to the whole character
and inner state of man. But it is now generally recognized that such freedom of the will is a
psychological fiction. However, the decree is not necessarily inconsistent with human freedom
in the sense of rational self-determination, according to which man freely acts in harmony with
his previous thoughts and judgments, his inclinations and desires, and his whole character. This
freedom also has its laws, and the better we are acquainted with them, the more sure we can
be of what a free agent will do under certain circumstances. God Himself has established these