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the Divine Being. Man does not elicit knowledge from God as he does from other objects of
study, but God conveys knowledge of Himself to man, a knowledge which man can only accept
and appropriate. For the appropriation and understanding of this revealed knowledge it is, of
course, of the greatest importance that man is created in the image of God, and therefore finds
helpful analogies in his own life. In distinction from the a priori method of the Scholastics, who
deduced the attributes from the idea of a perfect Being, this method may be called a posteriori,
since it takes its startingpoint, not in an abstract perfect Being, but in the fulness of the divine
self-revelation, and in the light of this seeks to know the Divine Being. C. Suggested Divisions of
the Attributes.
The question of the classification of the divine attributes has engaged the attention of
theologians for a long time. Several classifications have been suggested, most of which
distinguish two general classes. These classes are designated by different names and represent
different points of view, but are substantially the same in the various classifications. The
following are the most important of these:
1. Some speak of natural and moral attributes.
The former, such as self-existence, simplicity,
infinity, etc., belong to the constitutional nature of God, as distinguished from His will. The
latter, as truth, goodness, mercy, justice, holiness, etc., qualify Him as a moral Being. The
objection to this classification is that the so-called moral attributes are just as truly natural (i.e.
original) in God as the others. Dabney prefers this division, but admits, in view of the objection
raised, that the terms are not felicitous. He would rather speak of moral and non-moral
attributes.
2. Others distinguish between absolute and relative attributes.
The former belong to the
essence of God as considered in itself, while the latter belong to the divine essence considered
in relation to His creation. The one class includes such attributes as self-existence, immensity,
eternity; and the other, such attributes as omnipresence and omniscience. This division seems
to proceed on the assumption that we can have some knowledge of God as He is in Himself,
entirely apart from the relations in which He stands to His creatures. But this is not so, and
therefore, properly speaking, all the perfections of God are relative, indicating what He is in
relation to the world. Strong evidently does not recognize the objection, and gives preference
to this division.
3. Still others divide the divine perfections into immanent or intransitive and emanent or
transitive attributes.
Strong combines this division with the preceding one, when he speaks of
absolute or immanent and relative or transitive attributes. The former are those which do not
go forth and operate outside of the divine essence, but remain immanent, such as immensity,
simplicity, eternity, etc.; and the latter are such as issue forth and produce effects external to