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for this doctrine: John 1:13; 3:5; 6:44; 8:34; 15:4,5; Rom. 7:18,24; 8:7,8; 1 Cor. 2:14; II Cor. 3:5;
Eph. 2:1,8-10; Heb. 11:6. Pelagians, however, believe in the plenary ability of man, denying that
his moral faculties were impaired by sin. Arminians speak of a gracious ability, because they
believe that God imparts His common grace to all men, which enables them to turn to God and
believe. The New School theologians ascribe to man natural as distinguished from moral ability,
a distinction borrowed from Edwards’ great work On the Will. The import of their teaching is
that man in his fallen state is still in possession of all the natural faculties that are required for
doing spiritual good (intellect, will, etc.), but lacks moral ability, that is, the ability to give proper
direction to those faculties, a direction well-pleasing to God. The distinction under
consideration is advanced, in order to stress the fact that man is wilfully sinful, and this may
well be emphasized. But the New School theologians assert that man would be able to do
spiritual good if he only wanted to do it. This means that the “natural ability” of which they
speak, is after all an ability to do real spiritual good.[Cf. Hodge, Syst. Theol. II, p. 266.] On the
whole it may be said that the distinction between natural and moral ability is not a desirable
one, for: (1) it has no warrant in Scripture, which teaches consistently that man is not able to do
what is required of him; (2) it is essentially ambiguous and misleading: the possession of the
requisite faculties to do spiritual good does not yet constitute an ability to do it; (3) “natural” is
not a proper antithesis of “moral,” for a thing may be both at the same time; and the inability
of man is also natural in an important sense, that is, as being incident to his nature in its
present state as naturally propagated; and (4) the language does not accurately express the
important distinction intended; what is meant is that it is moral, and not either physical or
constitutional; that it has its ground, not in the want of any faculty, but in the corrupt moral
state of the faculties, and of the disposition of the heart.
3. ORIGINAL SIN AND HUMAN FREEDOM.
In connection with the doctrine of the total inability
of man the question naturally arises, whether original sin then also involves the loss of
freedom, or of what is generally called the liberum arbitrium, the free will. This question should
be answered with discrimination for, put in this general way, it may be answered both
negatively and positively. In a certain sense man has not, and in another sense he has, lost his
liberty. There is a certain liberty that is the inalienable possession of a free agent, namely, the
liberty to choose as he pleases, in full accord with the prevailing dispositions and tendencies of
his soul. Man did not lose any of the constitutional faculties necessary to constitute him a
responsible moral agent. He still has reason, conscience, and the freedom of choice. He has
ability to acquire knowledge, and to feel and recognize moral distinctions and obligations; and
his affections, tendencies, and actions are spontaneous, so that he chooses and refuses as he
sees fit. Moreover, he has the ability to appreciate and do many things that are good and
amiable, benevolent and just, in the relations he sustains to his fellow-beings. But man did lose
his material freedom, that is, the rational power to determine his course in the direction of the