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man in so far as God realizes it through the self-activity of the creature. There is
interpenetration here, but no mutual limitation.
c. That the work of God and that of the creature in concurrence are co-ordinate. This is already
excluded by what was said in the preceding. The work of God always has the priority, for man is
dependent on God in all that he does. The statement of Scripture, “Without me ye can do
nothing,” applies in every field of endeavor. The exact relation of the two is best indicated in
the following characteristics of the divine concurrence.
3. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DIVINE CONCURRENCE.
a. It is previous and pre-determining, not in a temporal but in a logical sense.
There is no
absolute principle of self-activity in the creature, to which God simply joins His activity. In every
instance the impulse to action and movement proceeds from God. There must be an influence
of divine energy before the creature can work. It should be noted particularly that this influence
does not terminate on the activity of the creature, but on the creature itself. God causes
everything in nature to work and to move in the direction of a pre-determined end. So God also
enables and prompts His rational creatures, as second causes, to function, and that not merely
by endowing them with energy in a general way, but by energizing them to certain specific acts.
He worketh all things in all, I Cor. 12:6, and worketh all things, also in this respect, according to
the counsel of His will, Eph. 1:11. He gave Israel power to get wealth, Deut. 8:18, and worketh
in believers both to will and to do according to His good pleasure, Phil. 2:13. Pelagians and
Semi-Pelagians of all kinds are generally willing to admit that the creature cannot act apart from
an influx of divine power, but maintain that this is not so specific that it determines the
character of the action in any way.
b. It is also a simultaneous concurrence.
After the activity of the creature is begun, the
efficacious will of God must accompany it at every moment, if it is to continue. There is not a
single moment that the creature works independently of the will and the power of God. It is in
Him that we live and move and have our being, Acts 17:28. This divine activity accompanies the
action of man at every point, but without robbing man in any way of his freedom. The action
remains the free act of man, an act for which he is held responsible. This simultaneous
concurrence does not result in an identification of the causa prima and the causa secunda. In a
very real sense the operation is the product of both causes. Man is and remains the real subject
of the action. Bavinck illustrates this by pointing to the fact that wood burns, that God only
causes it to burn, but that formally this burning cannot be ascribed to God but only to the wood
as subject. It is evident that this simultaneous action cannot be separated from the previous
and pre-determining concurrence, but should be distinguished from it. Strictly speaking it, in
distinction from the previous concurrence, terminates, not on the creature, but on its activity.