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Paul in Rom. 9 speaks from a pre-creation standpoint, an idea that is favored (a) by the fact that
the potter’s work is frequently used in Scripture as a figure of creation; and (b) by the fact that
the potter determines each vessel for a certain use and gives it a corresponding quality, which
might cause the vessel to ask, though without any right, Why didst Thou make me thus? (2)
Attention is called to the fact that some passages of Scripture suggest that the work of nature
or of creation in general was so ordered as to contain already illustrations of the work of
redemption. Jesus frequently derives His illustrations for the elucidation of spiritual things from
nature, and we are told in Matt. 13:35 that this was in fulfilment of the words of the prophet, “I
will utter things hidden from the foundation of the world.” Comp. Ps. 78:2. This is taken to
mean that they were hidden in nature, but were brought to light in the parabolic teachings of
Jesus. Ephesians 3:9 is also considered as an expression of the idea that the design of God in the
creation of the world was directed to the manifestation of His wisdom, which would issue in the
New Testament work of redemption. But the appeal to this passage seems, to say the least,
very doubtful. (3) The order of the decrees, as accepted by the Supralapsarians, is regarded as
the more ideal, the more logical and unified of the two. It clearly exhibits the rational order
which exists between the ultimate end and the intermediate means. Therefore the
Supralapsarians can, while the Infralapsarians cannot, give a specific answer to the question
why God decreed to create the world and to permit the fall. They do full justice to the
sovereignty of God and refrain from all futile attempts to justify God in the sight of men, while
the Infralapsarians hesitate, attempt to prove the justice of God’s procedure, and yet in the end
must come to the same conclusion as the Supralapsarians, namely, that, in the last analysis, the
decree to permit the fall finds its explanation only in the sovereign good pleasure of
God.[Bavinck, Geref. Dogm. II, p. 400.] (4) The analogy of the predestination of the angels
would seem to favor the Supralapsarian position, for it can only be conceived as supralapsarian.
God decreed, for reasons sufficient to Himself, to grant some angels the grace of perseverance
and to withhold this from others; and to connect with this righteously the confirmation of the
former in a state of glory, and the eternal perdition of the latter. This means, therefore, that
the decree respecting the fall of the angels forms a part of their predestination. And it would
seem impossible to conceive of it in any other way.
b. Objections to it:
Notwithstanding its seeming pretensions, it does not give a solution of the
problem of sin. It would do this, if it dared to say that God decreed to bring sin into the world
by His own direct efficiency. Some Supralapsarians, it is true, do represent the decree as the
efficient cause of sin, but yet do not want this to be interpreted in such a way that God
becomes the author of sin. The majority of them do not care to go beyond the statement that
God willed to permit sin. Now this is no objection to the Supralapsarian in distinction from the
Infralapsarian, for neither one of them solves the problem. The only difference is that the
former makes greater pretensions in this respect than the latter. (2) According to its